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Abstract
'

In a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design'216 Ss' attitudes were measured with
reference to a "U.S. - Russian Pooling of Resources" issue.

1/2 of the

Ss then received a high credible source biography wherein the "author of
the following message" was of excellent reputation and competence.
other half read a low credibility source biography.

The

Each of these groups

.was then further divided such that 1/2 received a message presented in
syllogistic form which argued for complete pooling of resources.

The

other half in each credibility condition received a similar message
written, however, in ordinary discursive fashion.

Half of the Ss in each

of these four celis were further asked to write out the conclusions to

..

'

the message they read while for the other 1/2 the conclusions were immediately
provided.

Following this !s were again asked to respond to the attitude

questionnaires.
Results, considering the pre- to posttest attitude change scores
indicate that the syllogistic approach to attitude change is superior
to the discursive approach providing that there are provisions made
for reinforcement during the learning session.

Differences in

results as measured by a simple Graphic Rating Scale and the Set11antic
Differential Scale suggest that the two scales are sensitive to quite
different attitudinal factors and that the Discursive Communication
somehow affects a wide range of these factors.

The Syllogistic

Communication, on the other hand, manipulates what is probabily a more
cognitive component of an attitude.

Results are interpreted as

providing reasonable support for a Reinforcement interpretation of

attitude change and as providing some negat£ve evidence for a
Consistency Theory interpretation.

Chapter I
Since Thurstone's (1929, 1931, Thurstone & Chave, 1929) early
work on their measurement, perhaps the greatest impetus for the study
of attitudes and attitude change was that provided by the Yale Communications Research Program and culminating in the Reinforcement Theory
as most concisely set forth in Hovland, Janis, & Kelley's (1953)
Communication and Persuasion.

The work of this group, focussed as

it was on some of the more relevant external variables involved in
attitude change, has yielded a lasting empirical framework and methodology to a formerly barren study.

Yet a meaningful theoretical inte-

gration of the empirical data generated by this early work was slow in
coming, and it is only more recently that the social psychologist i.has
seriously met this need.
The most prominant current response to a theoretical integration,
that of Consistency Theory, while providing an exceedingly heuristic
framework, must nevertheless in the last analysis be considered as
descriptive as opposed to explanatory.

Thus, whether under the guise

of a tendency towards balance (Heider, 1946, 1958), a dissonancereducing drive (Festinger, 1957; Brehm & Cohen, 1962), a need for
congruity (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1953), or simply a reflection
of the "homeostatic principle governing all of nature,"

this group of

theorists posits some fundamental principle whereby the human psyche
seeks to maintain a consistent set of orientations towards any given
stimulus object and between any multiplicity of similar stimulus objects.
And it is this tendency which allows of attitude change when any one
of its sub-systems has changed.

Little attempt is made by these theorists
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to explain the process of attitude change with any more fundamental
analysis than that of a consistency tendency or drive.

Learning,

attention, and acceptance factors (cf. Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953)
are largely ignored, as are personality and situational factors which
might mitigate or enhance the conditions under which, and the degree
to which, attitude change will occur.

These questions are left to

others whose interests run more along these lines.

Thus, social psycho-

logy is bequeathed with a concept, the validity of which is doubtful,
to be incorporated wherever it seems suitable or convenient.
Rei~forcement

Theory, providing the brientation for Hovland,

et al. (1953), has traditionally classified an attitude as a learned
response to a given set of stimuli (cues).

Such learning, of course,

is contingent upon factors of reinforcement which establish the bonds
between the cues and opinion responses, the product of which is the
attitudinal response.

Although it is unclear as to the nature of the

specific reinforcement, or to the motivational basis for such reinforcement, it has been proposed by Skinner (1953) that such

rein~

forcement can be derived from the fact of "being right" or of having
confirmed the expectations, anticipations and the like which follow
from one's opinions.

Such confirmation provides for secondary rein-

forcement, thus strengthening the cue-response habit known as attitude.
Counterconnnunications establish competing responses (i.e., those opinions
expressed by the conununicator) to a similar set of cues (the.same attitude
object), and the bonds for these cue-response chains are reinforced
through those factors which generate confirmation for the advocated
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attitudinal position.

Attitude change occurs when these new fionds

exceed the strength of the originally-held cue-opinion bonds.
Since attitude change results through a superior summated or
averaged (the function is not made clear) bond strength of all those
counterattitudinal opinions which are responses to the same

~ttitude

object, it is the task of Reinforcement Theory to specify how it occurs
that the attitude will change when the cue-opinion responses have
changed.

As Insko (1967) puts it, " • • • if it is asserted that opinion-

mediated attitude change is a result of quasi-logical considerations,
then to what extent is a strictly reinforcement interpretation being
forsaken for a consistency point of,.view."

It is the purpose of this

paper to explore the learning process by which attitudes are changed,
within a strictly Reinforcement orientation, by experimentally investigating two of those variables assumed to be crucial to the learning
process, and by introducing a third variable which, while not necessarily
related to learning per se, is somehow related to the acceptance of
what has been learned.
Jones and Gerard tl967) present a paradigm for conceptualizing
attitudes which, while not violating the fundamentals of Reinforcement
Theory, does provide the departure for, but not an answer to, a possible
escape from the Reinforcement + Consistency .(cf. Insko, 1967) concession.
Hovland et al. (1953) imply that an attitude is something other
than a system of cue-opinion bonds, yet enjoys only the strength and
direction of those bonds.

It may be said that cognitions give rise to

opinions and these opinions are the base stuff of which attitudes are
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formed.

But an attitude is something different, else it would neces-

sarily change with opinion change.

Jones and Gerard, however, conceive

of an attitude 'as nothing more than a conclusion to a set of beliefs
and values.

EY.

Thus,

definition, if any belief or value changes, so

also must the attitude.

Avoiding for the moment a bow to Consistency

Theory, then, the task is to examine belief and value change from which
attitude change necessarily must follow.
Following a Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (1957) approach, given the
total set of stimuli (cognitions) manifested by an object, a cognitive
category is in the first instance tentatively defined as· that which
specifies which of those cues are
and which are irrelevant.
a cognitive system.

r·~levant

(i.e., define the object)

The category is, then, a system of cognitions,

However, cognitive categories do not exist in

isolation from one another, but rather are, through experience (i.e.,
learning), found to be to
one another.

a greater

or lesser extent associated with

Jones and Gerard term this type of association a belief.

Thus the phrase "Lemons are yellow" is simply the singling out of one
of the relevant (i.e., defining) cues from the category "lemon," and
expressing this.

However, the phrase "Lemons go well with fish" is not

necessarily the expression of a category as previously defined, since
neither "lemon" nor "goes well with fish" defines the other.

Rather,

this is tje expression of a belie.f--the association of two categories
when neither defines the other.

Thus, the individual has found that,

at least within the realm of his own experience, "lemon" and "goes well
with fish" are often associated with one another, and thus he believes
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that "lemons go well with fish."
In addition to cognitions (cues), categories and beliefs Jones
and Gerard define the concept of value as an association between a
category and an emotional feeling.

Thus, while the expression "lemons

go well with fish" would be the expression of a belief, "What goes
well with fish is good" would be the expression of a value.
Now. it was previously stated that an attitude is the conclusion
drawn from a set of beliefs and values.
attitude is formally

def~ned

More specifically, however, an

by Jones and Gerard, as the conclusion drawn

from a syllogism containing one belief premise•and one value premise.
Thus, given the belief:

_

Lemons go well with fish

and the value:

What goes well with fish is good

the conclusion:

Lemons are good

must necessarily be drawn.

This conclusion, then, is the attitude

towards lemons for the individual accepting both the belief and the
value premise.
Since an attitude is for Jones and Gerard nothing more than the
conclusion to a belief (cognitive) and a value (affect) premise, if either
changes so also must the attitude change.
however, that it

is~

It needs to be emphasized,

virtue of definition alone

that this.paradigm

seems to be other than a rephrasing of Consistency Theory.

Upon

closer inspection,however, what is being said is that attitude change is
not a consequence of any balance tendency, but rather, that the phenomenon
of a balance tendency is simply a consequence of the nature of an
attitude, but only as defined by Jones and Gerard.

And just as-a strictly
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Reinforcement interpretation seems to have been forsaken for a Consistency
point of view (cf. Insko, 1967), so also is the Jones and Gerard vulnerable
to a comparable cricitism.

For, again, it is solely by definition

of an attitude as a syllogistic conclusion that the Jones-Gerard
paradigm escapes classification as a Consistency Theory.
Furthermore it seems that this model is more appropriate from a
post hoc than from a predictive point of view.

Thus, given a person's

attitude, it should be.possible, on the basis of skillful interviewing
techniques, to construct those syllogistic premises which lead to the
conclusion. (attitude) •. And since an attitude need not simply be the
conclusion to one syllogism, but

ma~

be the conclusion to a chain of

interrelated syllogisms (i.e., the vertical structure) it should be
theoretically possible to discover this entire·vertical structure of
an attitude.

Likewise, on the assumption that a given attitude is the

result of several or more chains of syllogisms, it should be possible
to discover this horizontal structure as well.
'I<.

trace back from conclusions to premises is one thing.

However,

to proceed from premises to conclusions is a more difficult task, for
there is no assurance that an individual will accept the premises.
Finally, Jones and Gerard assume that the correct conclusion will
be accepted when drawn, an assumption which, in light of research in
defensive processes, seems unwarranted.

Thus, a refinement of the model

is needed to explain the conditions under which premise and conclusion
will be accepted, and furthermore, to specify the degree of this acceptance (i.e., the degree of attitude change that will take place).
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Thus far, in summary, it has been indicated that while Consistency
Theory attempts to provide a theoretical integration of attitude change
research it largely ignores many of those factors which.Reinforcement
Theory has shown to be relevant to the attitude change process.
Furthermore, it was noted that Consistency Theory merely posits an
unproven assumption to explain the process and is, in the last analysis,
descriptive as opposed to analytic.

Yet Reinforcement Theory, itself,

is subject to criticism since it has not made clear how it is that an
attitude will change when the cue-opinion bonds have changed, and it is
the purpose of this paper to explore this question more fully.
The Jones and

G~rard

paradigm procides the starting point for

this investigation by providing a framework within wmich attitudes can
be conceptµalized.

Yet it was noted that their approach rests solely on

its narrow definition of an attitude and furthermore that its value lay
more in a post.hoc understanding than a predictive analysis.
while retaining the Jones and Gerard

paradig~

Thus,

for organizational pur-

poses the theoretical orientation of this paper is on a Reinforcement
interpretation of attitude change.
According to Hovland, Janis, and Kelley, attitude change is
contingent upon three factors:

a) attention to the counterattitudinal

communication; b) comprehension of the position advocated; and c)
acceptance of this position.

The first two factors can easily be

collapsed into a general learning
throughout this paper.

'
~actor

and will be considered as such

Thus, attitude change is directly related to

a) the learning of the communication, and b) the acceptance of this

9

communication.
According to Skinner, that factor which is most important for
learning to occur is reinforcement contingent to the performance of a
correct response.

Thus, given that an individual has made a response

to a given set of stimuli, if that response is acknowledged as "Correct"
the result is reinforcement to the indiv.idual and an increased liklihood that that response will again be made to a similar set of stimuli
on a subsequent occasion.,

A second factor which he says will maximize

learning is the judicious arrangement of stimuli (cues) designed to
elicit the desired learning response.

Thus, through the careful arrange-

ment of stimuli one is able to increase the probability of a correct
response being elicited.
is twofold:

The purpose of a stimulus program, then,

a) the maximization of the opportunity for reinforcement

to the individual at each step in the learning process, in order to
maximize the occurance of reinforcement during the learning process; and
b) the minimization of the abruptness of these learning steps involved
in progressing through the learning session (i.e., gradualness), in
order to maximize the probability of eliciting the correct learning
response.
The logical syllogism is, according to Skinner, a way of arranging
stimuli such that there is a maximum liklihood of the desired response
being elicited.

Furthermore, the vertical structure of a series of

related syllogisms can be regarded as nothing more than a program leading
to the final (advocated attitudinal position) learning response, and

thu~,

maximizes the probability of eliciting that desired learning response.
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secondly, the conclusion to each syllogism (learning step) in this
learning program provides a logical opportunity for reinforcement during
the learning session and ,provides as many opportunities for this reinforcement as there are syllogisms in the program.

A syllogistic

program, then, can be interpreted as an extremely efficient program
leading to the learning of the desired c9unterattitudinal position.
A discursive argument can also be viewed as a program leading
to the elicitation of the desired learning response.

In the interests

of "correct" literary. format and of holding the interest of the reader,
however, there is less emphasis
formal logic.

~n

rigid adherence to the mechanics of

Thus, argument premises may be presented out of logical

order or as "diluted" through the addition of irrelevant (from a logical
point of view) terms and connecting phrases.

Conclusions need not follow

immediately after the presentation of premises and may, in fact, be stated
several or more paragraphs later, thus losing their impact as necessary
conclusions in the interests of literary appeal or dramatic impact.
Furthermore, because a discursive communication can be reduced
only to the paragraph level without interrupting an integral train of
thought there are only as many opportunities for the drawing of meaningful
conclusions as there are well-constructed paragraphs.

And even these

opportunities may be somewhat arbitrary and random since an integral
thought-pattern may be at other times considered as small as the sentence
or even the word, or, as large as the communication itself.

Yet to

arbitrarily interject conclusion-drawing requirements in such a manner
may only serve to confuse the reader or to lead him astray since the
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premises necessary for correct conclusion-drawing may have occurred
several sentences or paragraphs earlier, or may not even have been
presented as yet.

Thus, it is highly likely that a discursive program

is neither so carefully constructed n0r as efficient in providing for the
administration of reinforcement as contingent upon conclusion-drawing
during the learning

sess~on.

It follows, then, that the syllogistic

program will be superior to the discursive program in maximizing the
learning of the counterattitudinal communication.
Since it is not only the judicious arrangement of stimuli (
syllogistic versus discursive) that contributes to the learning of the
correct response, but even more impoctantly, the amount of reinforcement
provided during the learning session, it follows that if this reinforcement
schedule is reduced so also will, be the consequent learning.

Since Skinner

interprets the confirmation of the elicited response as "Correct" as
the reinforcement for that response such reinforcement requires that the
response be made before the reinforcement can occur.

This is to say,

then, that the individual must draw his own conclusion, before it is
presented to him in the program, if the syllogistic program superiority
as a function of reinforcement contingencies, is to obtain.

Likewise,

for such reinforcement to obtain in the discursive program the subject
must also draw his conclusions before they are presented by the program.
However, as has already been indicated, the opportunity for correct
conclusion-drawing is greater with the syllogistic program, thus giving
it its superiority over the discursive program.

If Skinner is correct, then,

when the opportunity for the individual to draw his own conclusions is
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absent the superiority of the syllogistic over the discursive program
will rest only on the more judicious arrangement of stimuli; thus the
superiority will be greatly reduced.
Finally, .once a counterattitudinal communication has been learned
it is further necessary that this position oe accepted in order for
attitude change to actually obtain.

Yet this acceptance is largely

dependent upon two broadly defined classes of variables.

The first of

these is the intrinsic value of the communication itself.

If the

communication is sufficiently compelling, i.e., if the conclusions

t~

the to the communication are seen as following necessarily from the
arguments used and if these argumenos have a certain face validity·,
then communication acceptance is likely to follow.

If, however, the

communication itself.is substandard, or if the reader is not aware that
the conclusions ilrawn are necessary conclusions oecause of a confusing
(from a strictly logical point of view) communi.cation, then i.t is likely
that acceptance will rely on variables extrnsic to the communication,
e.g., source considerations.
Now

a syllogistic program has both a well-defined horizontal

structjre (number of syllogistic chains· in the program}_, and a welldefined tightly knit vertical structure (i.e., each syllogistic cliain
itself).

Providing that the arguments have a certain face validity,

then the conclusions following from those arguments are recognized as
necessary, and thus acceptance is greatly facilitated.

A discursive

communication, on the other hand, has a
well-defined horizontal structure
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(operationally defined as the number of different arguments used in
the communication) but a poorly defined vertical structure.

Each

argument is usually not laid out in as· tight a fashion as in a syllogistic chain.

Thus conclusions are less likely to be seen as necessary

and there will be a greater dependence on external variables such as
source credibility for acceptance to occur.
On the basis of the preceeding discussion, then, the hypotheses
of this study are:
1. A Syllogistic program provides for greater attitude change then does
a Discursive program.
2. Conclusion-Drawing by subjects results in greater attitude change than
if subjects are not asked to draw their own conclusions.
3. High Source Credibility results in greater attitude change than low
Source Credibility.
4. An interaction is predicted between Programs and Conclusion-Drawing
such that the superiority of Syllogistic over Discursive programs is
significantly d·iminished in those conditions where subjects are not
asked to draw their own conclusions.
5. There is predicted a Program x Credibility interaction such that
the Source Credibility manipulation has less influence on attitude
change induced through the Syllogistic Program than it will have in
the Discursive conditions.
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Chapter II
Method

This experiment followed a 2 x f x 2 factorial design considering
the variables:
a) Program:

Syllogistic (S) versus Discursive (D)

b) Source Credibility:

High (HC) versus Low (LC)

c) Conclusion-Drawing:

Self-Drawn (SD) versus Other-Drawn (OD)

216 male and female

~s

from the firth through third year college classes

were tested during their regular summer school class periods.

Each S

was asked to indicate his attitude t;.owards a "U.S. - Russian Pooling of
Resources" issue by responding to two different attitude rating scales.
The first of these was a one-item, 100-point Graphic Rating Scale (GRS)
designed by McGuire (1960) on which

~s

were asked to evaluate the

probability of the truth of a statement which was strongly in favor of
a complete pooling of resources and talents (Appendix

I)~

As a secondary

measure an abridged (18-item, 126-point) Semantic Differential Scale
(SDS) was also used.

All items on this scale were selected for their

high h 2 (proportion of total factor v~riance accounted for) value,
seven from the".-ev.alaativ.e dimension, four from the potency dimension,
and one each from the oriented activity, tautness·,. novelty, recepti.vi.ty,
and aggressiveness dimensions as originally conceived by Osgood,
Suci, and Tannenbaum (1958), (Appendix II).

The Graphic Rating Scale

was selected because it is a general attitudinal meas.uring device designed
to evaluate basic changes in ·attitudinal position as a function of
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persuasion:

The Semantic Differential Scale, on the other hand, was

selected for its selectivity to those factors specifically related to
affective change only.
Source Manipulation.

Following this Ss read 'a short biography intro-

ducing either an extremely expert and trustworthy Ph.D. in the field
of aerospace research (HC), (Appendix III), or an extremely shady
teenager in a high school correctional institution (LC), (Appendix IV).
These biographies also indicated that Ss would later read a communicatiorr written by the individual whose biography they had just read.
After reading the biography §_s

~ere

asked to indicate how

expert and honest they considered t'f\e source to be as based on the information they had received in the biography.

Each of these two dimensions

was measured by subject-responses to an 11-point graphic scale ranging
from "No Expertness" (or "lionesty") at position "O" through"Complete
Expertness"(or "Honesty") at the 11th position (Appendix V).
Program Manipulation.

One-half of the Ss

in each Credibility condition

were then presented with a series of 9 interrelated syllogisms of the
type:

A leads to B
B leads to C
A leads to C

B leads to C
C leads to C
B ,leads to D

16
C leads to D
D leads to E

..•

etc., such that the final conclusion to each

of the two syllogistic lines of argument (5 syllogisms for the first
argument, 4 for the second) was that the

United States and Russia

should pool all of their resourses and talents in space exploration.
For example:
The highest purpose in life for man is the full realization of
his human potential
The full realization of his human potential lies in man's
understanding of his role in the Universe
Therefore:

the highest

purp~se

in life for man lies in his

understanding of his role in the Universe.
These syllogisms are presented in Appendices VI and VII.
For those Ss in the Discursive condition the two lines of
argument as used in the Syllogistic communication were presented in
an ordinary discursive fashion with correct sentence structure, syntax,
etc., (Appendices

VIII and IX).

No attempt was made to keep the length

of the two types of Programs equal although all major, minor and middle
terms in the Syllogistic Communication were used an equal number of
times in the Discursive Communication.
Conclusion-Drawing Manipulation.

One-half. of the Ss in each of these

four Credibility x Program cells were asked to write out the conclusion
to each of the syllogisms or discursive arguments based upon the argument
premises.

For these Self-Drawn treatments the premises were presented

on one page up to the point where a conclusion could be drawn.

At this

17
point space was provided and
conclusion to those premises.

~s

were asked to write in the correct
Ss were then asked to turn to the following

page upon which the correct conclusion was printed.

The page following

this contained another set of premises with space provided for writing
in conclusions, and so on, until the entire message had been presented
(Appendices VI and VIII).

Because the Syllogistic

co~dition

requires

considerably more writing since there were a total of 9 syllogisms
used (i.e., 9 sets of premises from·which conclusions could be drawn
versus two for the Discursive treatments), those

~sin

the Discursive

cells were also asked to write a short summary of the major arguments
in addition to the conclusions to control for total amount of writing

•

required (Appendix VIII).

Finally, for those

~sin

the Other-Drawn

cells the conclusions to the premises followed immediately from those
premises.

Ss were not asked to draw the conclusions first (Appendices

VII and IX).
Following this Ss were asked to again respond to the two attitude
rating scales.
and dismissed.

They were then told the general nature of the study
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Chapter III
Results

Two different scales were used to measure attitudes towards
the "U.S. - Russian Pooling of Resources" issue.

The first and

primary measure was a one-item, 100-point Graphic Rating Scale as used
by McGuire (1960).

As

a secondary measure, an abridged 18-item

Osgood Semantic Differential Scale was also used.

Since each item

on this scale is checked on a seven-point scale there is a 126-point
maximum score.

The dependent measure being considered in

is the pre- to posttest change in s06le ratings for each S.

this study
A2 x 2 x 2

analysis of variance was performed considering each of the two scales
separately.
Graphic Rating Scale.

Table 1 presents the means and standard devia-

tions of the pre- and posttest attitude ratings for each of the eight
cells of this study.
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Table 1
Graphic rating scale
Pre- and posttest means and standard deviations

Pre
Hi-Cred

x

Lo-Cred

x

Self-Drawn
Syllogistic
Hi-Cred
Author-Drawn

SD

x
·SD

Lo-Cred

x

Hi-Cred

x

Lo-Cred

x

Hi-Cred

x

..

Self-Drawn
Discursive
Author-Drawn

SD

A.'

c ·-"

Lo-Cred

SD

SD
SD
SD

x
SD

Post

74. 30
23.09

85.15
18.88

72. 30
22.26

82.70
16.95

66.67
29.09

.71. 78
28.32

59. 70
26.41

61.85
26.88

60.63
29. 72

70.52
26.61

79.04
22.66

80.63
22.22

67.33
27.95

71.11
29.06

69.11
18.24

71.89
17.84

II
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A score of 0 represents an attitudinal position completely discrepant
from that advocated by the experimental communication while a score of
100 represents a position in complete agreement with

th~t

of the message.

Table 2 presents the attitude change scores for these same cells.
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Table 2
Graphic rating scale
Means and standard deviations of the
Absolute Attitude Change Scores
for each of the eight treatment cellsa

Hi-Cred

x

Lo-Cred

x

Hi-Cred

x

SD

110.85
15.61

Self-Drawn
SD

Syllogistic

..

Author-Drawn
Lo:..cred

Hi-Cred
Self-Drawn

SD

x
SD

x
SD

Lo-Cred

x

Hi-Cred

x

Lo-Cred

SD

Discursive
Author-Drawn

SD
SD

x

110.41
22.19
105.11
12.89
102.15
8.46

109.89
17.85
101.59
9.12
103. 77
12. 71
102.74
6.22

aThese scores refle~t a constant of 100 added to all absolute scores
to eliminate, for computational purposes, all negative values.
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To compute this measure each S's pretest score was subtracted from his
posttest score to yield an attitude change measure with a possible range
of from -100 to +100 •. A positive score indicates change in a directopm
consistent with that advocated in this study.
Table 3 is the ANOVA summacy table for this· attitude
change data.

•
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Table '3
Graphic rating scale
ANOVA summary table:
Absolute attitude change scores

df

SS

MS

F

Program (P)

1

373.41

373.41

1. 66

Conclusion-Drawing (C)

1

1213.63

1213.63

5.41*

Source Credibility (S)

1

547.85

547.85

2.44

Source

p x

c

1

275.63

275.63

1.23

p x

s

1

11.8.52

118. 52

<'.:1

c

x

s

1

75.85

75.85

~1

p x

c

1

322.67

322.67

Error

208

46699.04

224.51

Total

215

49626.59

*.E_(,05

x

s

1.44
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It can be noted that only one main effect, that of Conclusion-Drawing
was significant

(!

=

5.41, df = 1, 208, E.<.05), indicating that self-

drawing of conclusions resulted in greater attitude change than when·.
conclusions were drawn for the Ss.

There were no siSnificant inter-

actions.
Semantic Differential Scale.

Table 4 presents the means and standard

deviations of the pre and posttest attitude ratings for each of the
experimental cells as evaluated by the Semantic Differential Scale.
On this scale also a score of 0 represents an attitudinal position maximally discrepant from that advocated in the study while a score of 126
represents an attitudinal position maximally congruent with that of
•
the advocated message.
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Table 4
Semantic Differential Scale
Pre- and posttest means and standard deviations

Pre
Hi-Cred

x

Lo-Cred

x

Hi-Cred

x

Lo-Cred

x

SD

-

Self-Drawn

SD

Syllogistic

SD

Author-Drawn

Hi-Cred
Self-Drawn

SD

x
SD

Post

98.19
12.88

102~33::

96.15
12.98

99.26
19.35

91.85
16.00

94.78
19.27

91.07
16.51

94.48
16.36

91.00
16.06

93.78
17. 58.

99.81
16.37

99.11
19.27

12. 21-

Lo-Cred

x

Hi-Cred

x

92.56
SD . :·;. '14. 32

29.15
15.76

Lo-Cred

x

91.11
19.38

Discursive
Author-Drawn

SD

SD

93.48
16.52
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'

Table 5 presents the attitude change scores for these same cells.

Com-

putation of these measures was identical to that for the Graphic Rating
Scale.

The possible range of scores, however, varies from -126 to

+126 with a negative score indic~ting the boomarange effect •

•
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Table 5
S~mantic

Differential Scale

Means and standard deviations of the
absolute attitude change scores
for each of the eight treatment cellsa

x

Hi-Cred

SD

Self-Drawn

x

Lo-Cred

SD

Syllogistic

x

Hi-Cred
Author-Drawn

SD
•

Lo-Cred

Hi-Cred
Self-Drawn
Lo-Cred
Discursive
Hi-Cred
Author-Drawn
Lo-Cred

x
SD

x
SD

x
SD

x
SD

x
SD

104.15
13.41
103.19
13. 71
102.43
9.36
103.41
7.97

102.78
7.78
99.30
7.13
971.160
7.60
97.63
8.42

aThese scores reflect a constant of 100 added to all change scores to
eliminate, for computational purposes, all negative values.
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Table 6 is the ANOVA summary table for this attitude change data.

The

main effect of Programs was significant at the .01 level (F = 7.08,
df = 1, 208,

.E_~Ol),

indicating that the syllogistic message was

superior to the discursive in eliciting attitude change.
main or interactional, were evident:

No other

effect~
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Table 6
Semantic Differential Scale
ANOVA summary table
Absolute attitude change scores

Source
Program (P)

df

SS

¥S

1

696.96

696.96

7.08**

F

lJ

Conclusion-Drawing (C)

1

115.57

115.57

1.17

Source Credibility (S)

1

118. 52

118. 52

1. 20

p

x

c

1

50.07 .

50.07

.(1

p

x

s

1 •

83.13

83.13

<1

cx s

L

29.63

29.63

~1

PxCxS.

1

.02

.02

~1

Error

208

20~86.96

98.50

Total

215

21580.87

**12.<·0l
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While the findings of a Conclusion-Drawing main effect on the
Graphic Rating Scale, and of a Program main effect on the Semantic
Differential Scale are entirely consistent with the hypotheses of
this study, a closer inspection of the data suggested a method of
analysis which might provide a stronger test of the hypotheses.

A

tally of pretest scores on the Graphic Rating Scale indicated that treatment cells varied from 3 to 14 in the number of

~s

who had pretest scores

of 90 and above, thus leaving little or no room for any attitude change
to emerge at all.

On the Semantic Differential Scale the number of Ss

with scores of 110 and above varied from 1 to 6.

These pretest cell

differences, it was reasoned, might .have effectively interferred with
the results by limiting (or increasing). the amount of attitude change
that might have resulted had the scale ceiling been higher.

Thus it

was decided to reanalyze the data using as the dependent measure the
percent of change obtained relative to the amount of change possible.
In effect this measure "neutralizes" the effects of differing pretest
cell arrays by simply considering the percent of possible change actually
elicited.
Graphic Rating Scale.

To compute these percent scores for the

Graphic Rating Scale each

~'s

pretest score was subtracted from 100

(the highest score attainable).
change possible for that

~·

Each pretest score was then subtracted from

the posttest score for the same
absolute change elicited.

This provided a measure of the total

~

to yield a measure of the total

This second measure was then divided by the

.first to yield an index of the percent of actual change elicited relative
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to the amount possible.
of these change indices.

I

Table 7 presents the means and standard deviations
Table 8 is the ANOVA summary table for

this data.

"
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Table 7
Graphic Rating Scale
Means and .standard deviations of the
percent attitude change score.s
for each of the eight treatment cellsa

x

Hi-Cred

SD

1.39
.23

Self-Drawn

x

Lo-Cred

SD

1.28
.42

Syllogistic

x

I

Hi-Cred

..

Author-Drawn
Lo-Cred

SD

x.
SD

x

Hi-Cred

SD

Lo-Cred

x

Hi-Cred

x

1.18
.33
1.07
.23

1.24
.33

Self-Drawn
Discursive
Author-Drawn
Lo-Cred

SD
SD

x·;
SD

1.11
.28
1.23
.38
1.13
.25

aThese scores reflect a constant of 1.00 added to all percent scores
to eliminate, for computational purposes, all negative values.
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Table 8
Graphic Rating Scale

ANOVA sununary table:
Percent attitude change scores

Source

df

SS

MS

F

Program (P)

1

.1380

.1380

1.34

Conclusion-Drawing (C}

,1

.6089

.6089

6.04*

source Credibility (S}

1

.6825

.6825

6. 77**

1

.6052

.6052

6.01*

l'

.0006

.0006

~l

.0044

.0044

~1

~l

c

p

x

p

x s

cx s

1

PxCxS'

1

.0044

.0044

Error

208

20.9556

.1077

Total

215

22.9997

. **£. .(. 01

*.E..<· 05

•
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Reanalyzing the data in this manner, again using a 2 x 2 x 2 analysis of
variance, there emerged two significant main effects, those of ConclusionDrawing (!,

= 60.4,

= 1,

df

(!. = 6.78, df = 1, 208,

208,_J.~.15)

£~91).

and of Source Credibility

The first of these main effects indi-

cates, again, that the self-drawing of conclusions led to greater attitude change than author-drawing.

The second represents a superiority

of a high credible source over a low credible source in eliciting attitude
change.

The Program x

ficant (!. = 6.01, df

=

Conclusion-Dra~ing

1, 208, £(.05).

interaction was also signi-

By Duncan Multiple Range

Comparisons it was substantiated that the Syllogistic - Self-Drawn cell
emerged as. significantly higher (p_(.01, df
change elicited

than any other cell.

= 208)

in the amount of attitude

Although the Syllogistic -

Author-Drawn cell was considerably lower than either of the Discursive
Program cells, these

th~ee

did not differ significantly from one

another.
This interaction indicates that the syllogistic communication
is greatly influenced by whether or not
own conclusions.

~s

are required to draw their

Thus, when this opportunity is available the effec-

tiveness of the syllogistic program was significantly greater than that
of the Discursive Program, Self-Drawn or Author-Drawn.

Yet when this

opportunity was not available syllogistic superiority was greatly
reduced.

With a Discursive Program, however, the factor of conclusion-

drawing had little effect.

No other main effects or interactions were

significant.
Semantic Differential S.cale.

The computation of the percent change
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indices for the Semantic Differential Scale was identical to that for
the Graphic Rating Scale, :although the measure of total change possible
was determined by subtracting each pretest score from 126 (the highest
score attainable on this scale).

Table 9 presents the means and standard

deviations for these change indices.

Table 10 is the ANOVA summary

table for this data.

•
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Table 9
Semantic Differential Scale:
Means and standard deviations of the
Percent attitude change scores
for each of the eight treatment cellsa

Hi-Cred

x'

1.17
.31

Lo-Cred

x
SD

1. 20
• 34

SD

Self-Drawn
Syllogistic

x

Hi-Cred
Author-Drawn

SD
•

Lo-'Cred

Hi-Cred

·x
SD

x
SD

1.14
.24
1.13
.19

1.12
.21

Self-Drawn
Lo-Cred

x
SD

1.09
.26

Discursive
Hi-Cred

x
· SD

1.05
.14

Author-Drawn
Lo-Cred

x
SD

1.05
.18

aThese scores reflect a constant of 1.00 added to all percent
scores to eliminate, for computational purposes, all negative values.

r ________________________________________...,

-
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Semantic Differential Scale:
ANOVA summary table:
Percent attitude change scores

Source

df

SS

MS

F

Programs (P)

1

~3769

.3769

6.21*

Conclusion-Drawing (C)

1

.1530

.1530

2.52

Source Credibility (S)

1

• 0005

.0005 .

~1

p x

c

1

.0022

.0022

<1

p x

s

1

.0044

.0044

<:'.1

c

s

1 •

.0008

.0008

~1

cx s

1

.0137

.0137

~1

Error

208

12.6282

.0607

Total

215

13.1797

x

p x

*.E.-G 05

r --------------------------------------------------------.
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Again, as with the original change measures, the Program main effect
was significant (F

=

6.21, df

=

1, 208, .E..<'.OS) in the direction of

syllogistic superiority over that of a Discursive message.

No

other main effects or interactions were significant.
Incidental Analyses. In addition the analyses of variance two further
analyses were computed.

The first of these was a chi-square analysis

of the number of .§_s in the Conclusion-Drawing groups (Self-Drawn)
who actually arrived at the correct conclusion to the counterattitudinal communication.

Since the hypotheses of this study

rest upon the theory that it is in the learning of the arguments
leading up to the conclusions , and hot the learning of the
conclusions per

~

that differentiates the Syllogistic from the

Discursive conditions there should theoretically be no difference
between these groups in the learning of the conclusion itself.

Data

is available from this experiment to test this hypothesis within
those treatment groups in which Ss were asked to write in their own
conclusions.

Results of this chi-square analysis indicate no signi-

ficant differences in the number of

~s

arriving at the correct conclusion

between Syllogistic and Discursive conditions

Cl2,,.

.7623, df

= 208.

ns):

Finally, Pearson Product Moment Correlations were computed between
scores on the Graphic Rating Scale and the S.emantic Differential Scale.
On pretest scores this correlation was +.62 while on posttest scores
the correlation was +.65.
these two correlations.

There is no significant difference between
However, when the posttest correlations were

broken down by treatment group the results indicated some interesting
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trends which will be discussed later.

Table 11 presents these

correlations.
Table 11
Posttreatment Correlations between the
Graphi.c Rating Scale and the Semantic Differential Scale
for each of the eight treatment cells

Self-Draw
Hi-Cred

Author-Draw

Lo-Ored

Syllog.

.25

.60

Discur.

,80

• 79

Hi-Cred

•

Lo-Cred

.67

• 72

.68

.60
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Chapter IV
Discussion

Taken together, the results of this investigation provide reasonable
support for several of the research hypotheses of this study _while failing
to support, or only tentatively supporting,
Graphic Rating Scale.

two

others.

The basic working hypothesis of this

st~dy

is that, owing to its provisions for more ideal learning conditions,
the Syllogistic program will be superior to the Discursive program
in eliciting attitude change.

As measured by the Graphic Rating Scale

this nypothesis was not supported. •However, reanalyzing the data using
the percent attitude change indices the predicted frogram x ConclusionDrawing interaction emerged significantly.

The means for this interaction

suggest that a syllogistic message is far superior to any other Program
X Conclusion-drawing condition when §_s were asked to provide their own
conclusions.

The Syllogistic - Self-Drawn cell elicited greater than

30% more attitude change than any other cell.

When the opportunity

for conclusion-drawing is absent, however, this program elicited 10%
less change than did the next less effective cell, indicating that the
factor of conclusion-drawing is crucial to the effectiveness of a
Syllogistic program.

That it was not' simply· due to a greater incidence

of correct-conclusion knowledge by the Ss in the Syllogistic conditions is
supported by the Syllogistic versus Discursive chi-square analysis.
Both Syllogistic and Discursive §_s did, in fac t, know the correct
conclusion.

It was in the acceptance of this conclusion owing to

-

F·~-------------------------------------------------..
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a better learning of the supportive arguments that the Syllogistic
program was more effective.
The great dependence of the

Syllogi~tic

program on reinforcement

might explain the lack of a main Program effect since without

reinforceme~t

its effectiv eness is reduced over even that of a Discursive program.
The 42% difference in.the amount of attitude change between the Syllogistic - Self-Drawn and the Syllogistic - Author-Drawn cells, coupled
with the great inferiority of the Syllogistic - Author-Drawn over the
Discursive program, Self-Drawn or Author-Drawn, also seems to indicate
that syllogistic superiority as a function of judicious stimuli arrangement is a relatively minor concern.

•

It: appears as though stimuli

arrangement merely provides conditions within which the reinforcement
factor may operate, such that alone it is ineffective.

However, coupled

with reinforcement, this cell provides for significantly greater attitude
change than reinforcement alone, which in turn provides for greater
change than does any non-reinforcement condition.
The second major hypothesis of this study is that conclusiondrawing by the E_s will result in greater attitude change than if the
conclusions are immediately provided by the written communication
Drawn).

(Aut~cr-

As measured by the Graphic Rating Scale this hypothesis is

strongly supported using both the absolute change scores and 'the percent
change scores.

Although it cannot be stated with certainty tha·t this

finding reflects a superiority in learning owing to superior reinforcement
contingencies, the finding of.a significant Program x Conclusion-Drawing
interaction does lend considerable support to this interpretation since
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it is in the Syllogistic Program that the effects of reinforcement are
the more cogently taken advantage of.
Source Credibility.

A.!_ test on the· credibility ratings of the two

fictitious sources used provides unqualified support for the contention
that the credibility manipulation itself was successful (t

= 20.03,

df = 214, .£. =i.Ol) indicating that the High Credibility Source was,
indeed, perceived as more credible than was the Low: . Credible Source.
Yet a surprising finding from this study is that the credibility manipulation did not succeed in altering attitude change using absolute change
scores as the dependent measure.

As this finding is widely discrepant

•
from an enormous body of prior research stemming out of the Hovland,

Janis and Kelley (1953) school it serves to increase confidence in tqe
contention that there were possible abnormalities in the pretest data.
This, in turn, serves to further justify the use of percent attitude
change scores.

Using these indices, moreover, the credibility effect

emerges as highly significant.

This result is interpreted as supporting

the hypothesis that source credibility is an important factor in providing
for message acceptance, and hence, attitude change.
The failure to find the hypothesized Source x Program interaction
may reflect the fact that the Syllogistic program is effective only
under conditions of program reinforcement (cf., the Program x ConclusionDrawing interaction).

Thus considering the Syllogistic program over both

reinforcement conditions may have served to suppress any Program x
Credibility interaction that may have emerged.

The fact that the Program

main effect was nonsignificant serves to lerid a certain degree of

....
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confidence to this explanation.
Semantic Differential Scale.

As

measured by the Semantic Differential

Scale the only finding to emerge significantly was that.of the Syllogistic versus Discursive·program.

The Syllogistic program here was

significantly more effective in eliciting attitude change.

It is here

again especially surprising that source credibility was non-influencial,
and this lack of significance obtained both. under absolute and percent
attitude change measures.
This lack of support for an obvious prediction, and its contradiction to the Hovland, et al (1953) research leads to some interesting
•

speculation.

It is highly likely tha- the Semantic D.ifferential Scale, having' been
designed specifically to measure affective change, is too narrow in
scope, hence too insensitive, to many of the variables that might be
relevant to attitude change.

If this is so·,

then, only if Consistency

Theory is correct would a change in any of these variables be expected
to result in attitude change as measured by the Semantic Differential
Scale.

If, however, affective change does not automatically occur as

a consequence of cogni.tive change (Le., i f the. Consistency Theory
formulation is too

wide-swee~ing),

then the manipulation of those

variables re.lated to cognit:lve, i.e., bel:lef acceptance, would not be
expected to manifest themselves as affective-scale changes.
can be assumed that source

'
ceedibi~ity

If it

is, in fact, relevant to beli.ef-

acceptance, and this seems a reasonable assumption, then tha results of
this study provide support for this reasoning.

And thus, this study
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might be interpreted as providing negative support for a Consistency
hypothesis, since the manipulation of a more-properly cognitive factor
succeeded in affecting the amount of attitude change as measured by
a cognitive-oriented scale, and tlid not succeed in affecting ratings
on the affect-specific scale.
In exploring this reasoning further it is suggested that if it
is attitude change, and not attitude-component change that is being
evaluated, then if Syllogistic superiority is, in fact, based upon
more effective Program-learning then any scale designed to evaluate
attitudes should provide a reasonable measure of attitude change,
regardless of which "component" or cGlmbination of atittudinal "components" the scale is designed to measure.

If, however, its superiority

is due chiefly to some other factor, i.e., its more stark presentation
of the program conclusion (a cognitive manipulation only in this case,
and roughly analogous to Rosenberg and Abelson's

(1960) affective

manipulation via hypnosis), then a scale designed to measure affectave
change alone (i.e., the Semantic Differential Scale) would be relatively
insensitive to the Program manipulation unless the Consistency Theory
claim is valid (i.e., that there is some basic tendency or drive towards
cognitive-affective consistency).
A Discursive communication, on the other hand, would be heavily
reliant upon a broad measure of attitudes, and hence attitude change.
This is because its reduced effectiveness would require a measurement
scale sensitive to various attitudinal components in order for change
to be measurable.

A scale too selective in scope (i.e•, the Semantic

'------------------------------------------------,
~

.....-
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Differential Scale) might easily reduce the possibility of change being
detected.

And, in fact, the results of this study support this post hoc

reasoning also.

Changing the emphasis from Syllogistic superiority to

Discursive inferiority, then it may be that the

Discurs~ve

Program was

so ineffective as to result in no change on the highly selective Semantic
Differential Scale.

Thus, the Syllogistic Program emerged as

significantly more effective.

On the broader measurement scale,

however, the Graphic Rating Scale was sensitive to more of those variables
which might influence attitude change, and hence, more sensitive to
changes as a result of the Discursive as well as the Syllogistic Program.
The lack of significance on the GRS

~etween

these two Programs might

reflect this increased sensitivity of the Graphic Rating Scale.
In attempting to support this reasoning with further empirical
evidence correlation coefficients were obtained between the Graphic
Rating Scale and the Semantic Differential Scale evaluations by each S.
These results were presented in Table 11.

On the basis of this study

it can be assumed that reinforcement is a more influencial variable in
attitude change than is source credibility.

In fact, taking the study

as a whole, source credibility is a somewhat negligible consideration.
Thus, rank ordering the

treatmen~

groups for each Program condition on

the basis of their ability to provide maximum attitude change to occur
the following trends emerged.

As conditions decrease for the effectiveness·

of the Syllogistic Program, the consistency increases between the
more general attitudinal measuring device (the Graphic Ratiftg Scale)
and the more specific affective measuring scale.

As conditions decrease
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for Discursive effectiveness, on the other hand, this "cognitiveaffective" consistency ·decreases.

This finding may be interpreted as

supporting the contention that a Syllogistic program is highly effective
in inducing attitude change and, in fact, casts its influence on
general attitude change (or perhaps cognitive change) as opposed to
affective change alone.

A Consistency prediction would have been that

there should be no such correlational trends· evident.

Conversely,

however, the greater the possibility for Discursive effectiveness the
less becomes the consistency between the GRS and the SDS.

While this

is entirely consistent with Balance. Theory the fact remains that the
Discursive Program as a whole was less effective than was the Syllogistic Program, and thus, the support for Consistency Theory is somewhat
mitigated.

Another way of looking at this is that the better the con-

ditions for attitude change to occur the less is the relevance that the
Balance Principle holds.

What may be happening is that traditional

attitude change research failed to take advantage of maximum attitude
change conditions (i.e., the use of Discursive rather than Syllogistic+
Reinforcement Programs), and thus did not recognize the relationship
between what looks like a consistency drive and a continuum of attitude
change conditions ranging from "poor conditions for" to "good conditions
for" attitude change.

And the consistency drive, itself, may be nothing

more than a reflection of confounded variable manipulation owing to
the ambiguity over just what the Discursive communication actually
does manipulate.
Although this study does not. incorporate a direct test of this
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reasoning i t is felt that the. supportive evidence.- is. strong enough_ to
warrant further research along these lines.

The t"act that the

gistic approach to attitude cliange has not been

conaide~ed

paper, and the interesting results of th1s study,
further research.

S~llo

prior to thi,s

certain!~-

justify

However, there are certain difficultiea in

F,ein:f;orce1Jlent

interpretation which require a more refined formulation before further
research is undertaken.
Rosenberg (1960) presents persuasive evidence for a balance tendency.
Having altered the affective component of an attitude through hypnosis
it was observed that a certain cognitive reorganization did occur such
that beliefs came to

b~

consistent tlith the newly changed affect.

This

research provides perhaps the purest test of.Consistency Theory if it can
be assumed, that the hypnotically-induced affective change was, in fact,
just that.

That these findings, then, are contradictory to those of

the present study are, at this time, irreconcilable.
further research on Syllogistic attitude

cha~ge

Yet perhaps with

and a refinement of

the procedure used such differences can be explained.
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Appendix I
Graphic Rating Scale

Please indicate your own opinion of the'truth of the following statement
by drawing a line through the scale at the point where you feel the
probability of its truth lies. For example, given the statement:
Poverty leads to hunger
you would draw a line through the scale at a place pretty similar to
where it is drawn in this example: i.e.,

·o

10

20
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50

very
untrue

60

70

80

90

•

rIvery
loo
true

Now, do the following one yourself:
Statement:

0

very
untrue

10

With regard to space resea.rch, the United States and
Russia should pool all of their talents and resources.

20

30
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70

80

90

100

very
true
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Appendix II
Abridged Semantic Differential Scale

Please rate the following statement on each of the scales listed below.
We realize that some of the scales might not seem appropriate to you,
but do the best that you can in terms of your own opinions.
Statement:

With regard to space research, the United States and Russia
should pool all of their talents and resources.

I

I
1

I

I
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2

I

I

I
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52

-I
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I
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Appendix I II
High Credibility Source Biography

Dr. Harold R. Cullan, Ph.D., the author of the passage you are
about to read, is current Chairman -Director of CISA, the Council
on International Scientific Achievement. This council, now including
42 scientists from seven countries, was established'in 1962 by a group
of Soviet and American scientists committed to the potential of scientific inquiry in the area of space research within an atmosphere free
of political pressures. The Council has since been recognized as the
official policy-recommending organ of those countries involved.
Before assuming the Directorate of CISA by elective vote in 1965,
Dr. Cullan served as Chief Staff Consultant to the International Association for Aerospace Research during which time he was decorated for his
"
outstanding contribution to aeronautical safety engineering
through applied research."
Dr. Cullan received his Ph.D. from MIT, summa cum laude, in 1953,
and accepted a research post at the Institute for Aeronautical Engineering
where he conducted most of his research prior to his involvement in ·
international research policy. The passage you are about to read is
the basic syllogistic core of [for discursive conditions, "an exerpt
from"] the report submitted by Dr. Cullan in 1967 to the various aerospace
agencies of the participating CISA countries.
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Appendix IV
Low Credibility Source Biography

Harold R. Cullan, the author of the passage you are about to read,
is currently enrolled in a Chicago "parental" high school for operating
what was later exposed as a "fixed" sports lottery. It was estimated
that he had _earned over $700.00 from this racket before it was exposed.
The passage you are about to read is the basic syllogistic core
of [for discursive conditions, "an exerpt from"] a speech delivered as
an assignment for his Speech course. His assignment was to try and
convince the audience of' any point of view he selected. Each "team"
was given one day in which to prepare his arguments; and he would be
graded solely on the basis of how convincing his arguments were.
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Appendix'V
Credibility Manipulation Check

Place a check mark
scales below.

(

)

in one of the spaces on each of the two

1. How competent or expert do you feel the author is in preparing a
message directly related to the ideal operating relationship
between U.S. and Soviet space scientists?

~'~-'---'---'--~'---'--~'--~'---'----~'--~'~/
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
none

expert

•

2. How honest or truthful do you feel this author is.in delivering this
message which is directly related to the operating relationship
between U.S. and Soviet space scientists?

~'--~'--~'---'--~'-,--'--~l--~/___1
____~1_,,_~1---,--1
0
none

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
complete
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Appendix VI
Syllogistic Program:
Self-Draw Condition

On the following pages you will.read the message given by H. R.
Cullan. For the sake of clarity his statements are arranged in the
form of syllogisms. Each page will contain the two syllogistic
premises. Your task is to read these premises anG·to write in the
conclusion which follows from those premises. When you have finished
reading and concluding all of the syllogisms you will have read his
message. All of the syllogisms you will read and conclude follow
the format:
Premise 1:
Premise 2:
Conclusion:

A leads to B
B leads to C
A leads to C

Thus, for example, given the premises>
Poverty leads to hunger:
Hunger leads to illness:
Poverty leads to illness.

the conclusion which follows from these is
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Please write in the conclusion to each of the syllogisms on the following pages. After you have written in your conclusion, turn the page
to read the correct conclusion.

The highest purpose in life for man is the full realization of his
human potential
The full realization of his human potential lies in man's understanding
of his role in the Universe.

59

Therefore:

the highest purpose in life for man lies in his understanding
of his role in the Universe.

60

The full realization of his human potential lies in man's understanding
of his role in the Universe.
Man's understanding of his role in the Universe is, to a large extent,
dependent upon methods of scientific investigation.

61

Therefore:

the full realization of man's human potential is, to a
large extent, dependent upon methods of scientific investigation.

62

Man's understanding of his role in the Universe is, to a large extent,
dependent upon methods of scientific investigation.
Methods of scientific investigation are most fundamentally strategies
in problem-solving.

63

Therefore:

man's understanding of his role in the Universe relies most
fundamentally on strategies in problem-solving.

64

Methods of scientific investigation are most fundamentally strategies
in problem-solving.
Strategies in problem-solving require the maximization of cooperation
if they are to be maximally efficient.

65

Therefore:

methods of scientific investigation require the maximization
of cooperation if they are to be maximally efficient.

66

Strategies in problem-solving require the maximization of cooperation
if they are to be maximally efficient.
The maximization of cooperation requires the unselfish pooling of all
available talents and resources.

67

Therefore:

strategies in problem-solving require the unselfish pooling
,of all available talents and resources.

68

The interests of national security require a spirit of benevolence
between nations.
A spirit of benevolence between nations can only come about if .there
is an understanding between nations.

69

Therefore:

the interests of national security require that
an understanding between nations.

th~re

be

70

The spirit of benevolence between nations can only come about if there
is an understanding between nations.

An understanding between nations is best served through mutual
interaction.

71

Therefore:

the spirit of benevolence between nations is best served
through mutual interaction.

72

An understanding between nations is best served through mutual
interaction.
Mutual interaction is maximized through cooperative endeavors with
common goals,

73

Mutual interaction is maximized through cooperative endeavors with
common goals.
Cooperative endeavors with common goals are successful only to the
extent that there is a pooling of available resources and talents.

74

The final conclusion to the entire line of argument, then, is that:
With regard to space research, those countries involved in such
research should

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

The final conclusion to the entire line of argument, then, is that:
With regard to space research, those countries involved in such research
should pool all of their talents and
resources in order to achieve
I
international scientific goals.

77

Appendix VII
Syllogistic Program:
Author-Draw Condition

On the following pages you will read the message given by
H. R. Cullan. For the sake of clarity his statements are arranged in
the form of syllogisms. Each page will contain the two premises and
the conclusion which follows from those premises, such that when
you have finished reading all of the syllogisms you will have read
his message. All of the syllogisms you will read follow the format:
Premise 1:
Premise 2:
Conclusion:

A leads to B
B leads to C
A leads to C

Thus, for example, given the premises:

,I

Poverty leads to hunger:
Hunger leads to illness:
Poverty leads to illness.

the conclusion which follows from these is
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The highest purpose in life for man is the full realization of his
human potential.
The full realization of his human potential lies in man's understanding
of his role in the Universe.
Therefore:

the highest purpose in life for man lies in his understanding
of his role in the Universe.

The full realization of his human potential lies in man's understanding
of his role in the Universe.
Man's understanding of his role in the Universe is, to a large extent,
dependent upon methods of scientific investigation.
Therefore:

the full realization of man's human potential is, to a
large extent, dependent upon methods of scientific investigation.

Man's understanding of his role in the Universe is, to a large extent,
dependent upon methods of scientific investigation.
Methods of scientific investigation are most fundamentally strategies
in problem-solving.
Therefore:

man's unders.tanding of his role in the Universe relies
most fundamentally on strategies ::(n problem-solving.

Methods of scientific investigation are most fundamentallr strategiesin problem~solving.
Strategies in problem-solving require the maxirofzation
if they are to be maximally efficient.
Therefore:

o~

cooperation

methods of scientific investigation req_uire the. 111axi'n)ization
of cooperation if they are to oe maximally- efficient.

79

I ,

Strategies in problem-solving require the maximization of cooperation
if they are to be maximally efficient.
The maximization of cooperation requires the unselfish pooling of
all available talents and resources.
Therefore:

strategies in problem~solving require the unselfish pooling
of all available talents and resources.

The interests of national security require a spirit of benevolence
between nations.
The spirit of benevolence between nations can only come about if
there is an understanding between nations.
Therefore:

the interests of national security require that there be
an understanding between"l'lations.

The spirit of benevolence between nations can only come about if there
is an understanding between nations.
An understanding between nations is best served through
action.
Therefore:

m~tual

inter-

the spirit of benevolence between nations is best served
through mutual interaction.

An understanding between nations is best served through mutual
interaction.
Mutual interaction is maximized through cooperative endeavors with
common goals.
Therefore:

an understanding between nations is maximized through
cooperative endeavors with common goals.

80
Mutual interaction is mzximized through cooperative endeavors with
common goals.
Cooperative endeavors with common goals are successful only to the
extent that there is a pooling of available resources and talents.
Therefore:

mutual interaction is successful only to the extent that
. there is a pooling of available resources and talents.

With regard to space research, then, those countries involved in such
research should pool all of their talents and resources in order to
achieve international scientific goals.
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Appendix VIII
Discursive Program:
Self-Draw Condition

On the following page you will read the message given by H. R.
Cullan. For the sake of clarity his message has been condensed although
the essential points have not been changed. Please read the message
carefuoly. When you have finished you will be asked to summarize the
message and indicate the specific position taken by the author.
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Appendix VIII
Discursive Program:
Self-Draw Condition

Since the highest purpose in man's life is the full realization of
his human potential it would follow that only to the extent that he
realizes this potential can he achieve his ultimate purpose. Yet man
requires an unde'rstanding of his role in the Universe for this to obtain,
an understanding basea~on methods of scientific investigation using the
best strategies available for this problem-solving process. It is
largely through methods of scientific investigation based on such
problem-solving strategies that man will be able to understand his unique
role in the Universe.
Now it has been shown in numerous scientific investigations that
mutual cooperative interaction is the most efficient strategy for
problem-solving tasks, and hence, for methods of scientific investigation. And maximally cooperative p•oblem-solving strategies require
a sharing not only of knowledge and abilities, but also of those talents
and resources which are necessary for scientific investigation.
As further evidence for this need for the maximization of cooperative interaction in the problem-solving'process of scientific investigation, it should be realized that maximum cooperative interaction will,
because by definition it requires interpersonal interaction, endenger
a spirit of benevolence between the cooperating nations. This is because
such interaction towards a common goal lends itself to an increased
mutual, understanding and thus to benevolence. And certainly it is
unquestionable that a spirit of benevolence between nations would have
the advantage of contributing to the interests of national security.
Through cooperative sharing of resources and talents, then, the nations
involved can come to a better understanding of one another, an understanding
ofseommon goals, of ways of life, of feelings and attitudes, etc., all of
which serve not only to increase man's understanding of his role in the
Universe and of one another, but also which ease international conflicts,
thus furthering the interests of national security. I: would maintain,
in ::act, that a spirit of benevolence and an increased mutual understanding as a function of cooperation in the pooling of resources: and
talents is one of the best ways of insuring a realization of human
potential and human understanding since. such realization pe.rmi.ts problem.....
solving strategies unencumbered by selfish interests.

83

On this page write a brief summary of the arguments you have just
read and specify exactly what the ultimate conclusion to the entire
message is, according to its author.
Summary:

Specific Conclusion:
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Appendix IX
Discursive Program:
Author-Draw Condition

On the following page you wiil read the message given by H. R.
Cullan. For the sake of clarity his message has been condensed although
the essential points have not been changed. Please read the message
carefully. When you have finished you will be asked some questions
related to it.
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Appendix IX
Discursive Program:
Author-Draw Condition
Since the highest purpose in man's life is the full realization of
his human potential it would follow that only to' the extent that he
realizes this potential can he achieve his ultimate purpose. Yet man
requires an understanding of his role in the Universe for this to obtain,
an understanding based on methods of scientific investigation using the
best strategies available for this problem-solving process. It is
largely through methods of scientific investigation based on such
problem-solving strategies that man will be able to understand his unique
role in the Universe.
Now it has been shown in numerous scientific investigations that
mutual cooperative interaction is the most efficient strategy for
problem-solving tasks, and hence, for methods of scientific investigation. And maximally cooperative problem-solving strategies require
a sharing not only of knowledge and abilities, but also of those talents
and resources which are necessary fo~ scientific investigation.
As further evidence for this need for the maximization of cooperative interaction in the problem-solving process of scientific investigation, it should be realized that maximum cooperative interaction will,
because by definition it requires interpersonal interaction, engender
a spirit of benevolence between the cooperating nations. This' is because
such interaction towards a common goal lends itself to an increased
mutual understanding and thus to benevolence. And certainly it is
unquestionable that a spirit of benevolence between nations would have
.the advantage of contributing to the interests of national security.
Through cooperative sharing of resources and talents, then, the nations
involved can come to a bettel'.~understanding of ane another, an understanding
of common goals, of ways of life, of feelings and attitudes, etc., all of
which serve not only to increase man's understanding of his role in the
Universe and of one another, but also which ease international conflicts,
thus furthering the interests of national security. r would maintain,
in fact, that a spirit of benevolence and an increased mutual understanding as a function of cooperation in the pooling of resources and
talents is one of the best ways of insuring a realization of liuman
potential and human understanding since such realization permits problemsolving strategies· unencumbered by selfish interests.
In conclusion, then, I strongly recommend that our nations can
maximize their understanding of their roles in the Universe throqgh
a maximally· cooperative interaction involving the pooling of all talents
and resources. Such cooperative pooling of resources and talents would
certainly bring us closer to those scie:µtific goals- common to all ·nat:tons _,
sharing man's attempt at understanding his role in the Universe.
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